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Although it still may be fashionable
these days to recognize a dichotomy
in law schools between the practical and the theoretical
as LRW professors, we should resist the temptation, The
opposing conceptions of law school as "trade school"
and doctrinal academia do not neatly apply to what we
do. Focusing too much on how we train our students for
the real world, without highlighting our role in teaching
legal analysis) may undermine our relative position in
the academy and undervalue our role in legal education.
We confro nt daily the unmistakable reality that the world
outside law school is changing rapidly and changing
utterly. We get that teaching Shepard's in print does our
students a disservice. Online databases change and) with
them, change our instruction techniques. We want our
students well-placed to succeed, and to that end) we take
seriously our obligation to keep current and to inculcate
real-world skills) perhapsmo reso than the nextprofessor,
But overemphasis on how "practical" we are may
have its downside, in that professors regularly placed
into the "skills camp" often struggle for legitimacy
within their institutions Thus, touting our profession
solely in terms of practical skills - without recognizing
a fundamental identity of substantive purpose
between LW and doctrinal classes - may ultimately
disserve our collective aspirations for legitimacy
Few, if any doctrinal professors would claim teaching
black letter law as their paramount pedagogical goal.
Instead, we are told, they teach a critical way of
thinking, The Socratic Method, for example challenges
students by means of oppositional statements and
lines of inquiry into how to properly read a case, or
to synthesize several cases, and to arrive at a refined

rule statement. Over time, and with consistent practice,
students learn how to extract meaning from cases and
to synthesize rules that permit analogical application to
new circumstances. Modern strategies for transmitting
this skill may differ, but the objective of the doctrinal
class even today is to teach students to perceive logical
connections and to extrapolate. Of course, doctrinal
professors also instruct in a particular substantive
context. The torts professor gmrounds instruction in duty,
breach, and causation; the contacts professor speaks
of offer and acceptance. But as to each) the pedagogical
goals are nearly identical: to instruct students in a
mode of analysis while - incidentally - giving them
passing familiarity with a substantive body of law on
which they will be tested in the future. The doctrinal
class) properly understood, thus has its abstact
elements (teaching of legal inquiry) and its practical
applications (introduction of a specific vernacular).
What is it that we do in LRW instruction? We teach
students to express legal arguments. Along the

way, they learn to cite, find resources, and marshal
authority. But at the same time, our fundamental
focus is teaching students how to synthesize rules
and reason analogically. We teach them to read
cases critically, to discern logical rules, and to extend
these rules into previously unanticipated situations.
Just like the doctrinal professor our stock in trade is
immersing our students in the practice of legal analysis.
Though fewer of us may channel our inner Professor
Kingsfield as we do this all the same; our fundamental
objective differs little from that of the torts professor.
Properly understood, then, our class has its abstact
elements (teaching legal inquiry) and its practical
applications (introduction of a specific vernacular).
The contracting job market and mounting student
debt, rightly should prompt all those in academia to
navel-gaze and to ponder which among many methods
of teaching legal inquiry best situates our graduates
in the modern era, However, as LRW professors, we
may want to be careful as we proceed. The long-term
objective of situating LRW professors on terra firma
within the academy may best be served by trumpeting
the substantive aspects of our jobs first and foremost. U

